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Abstract
The long range transportation planning process is examined,
with explicit consideration of the real uncertainties.
Examples of the performance of transportation planning
models are presented. Errors in input data, as well as
socio-political bias are presented.
Fi nally, a series of
principles and methods for bet t er reflecting the real
uncertainties into transportation planning are presented.
Introduct ion
Fifteen years ago Marvin Manheim noted that we live in a
world of rapid change, citing three dimensions of change
relevant to transportation systems: change in demand, in
technology and in values (Manheim, 1979). We might also
note a wor ld of uncertainty; not only is change occurring,
it is occurring in ways we cannot anticipate. In spite of
the uncertainty we need to plan for the future. l~e need to
recognize uncertainty, yet not be paralyzed by it, to plan
for various contingencies that may derail the attainment of
valued goals of society.
The Urban Transportation Planning Process

Metropolitan Planning Organizations (MPOs) are responsible
for carrying out long range t ransportation planning,
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covering a period of at least twenty years, and for setting
transportation priorities for urbanized areas. MPOs make
use of a transportation planning process comprised of a
series of sequential models to describe the interactions
between land use, the t ransportation system, and travel.
The process begins by dividing the planning area into
traf fic analysis zones (TAZs) and estimating various
socio-economic activity measures, such as population and

employment, for each zone. The number of zones can vary
from 50 for a small urbanized area, to over a thousand for
a large metropolitan area .
Population and employment
totals are first forecasted f or a study area or r egion;
then allocated to each of t he TAZs in the study area.
·aased on demographic and economic characteristics, the tr ip
generation model estimates the number of trips produced or
attracted by each zone.
Subsequently,
the trip
distribution· model estimates the number of trips from each
zone to all other zones and the modal split model divides
the t rips into transit and auto modes.
The craffic
a ssignment model specifies the particular transportation
links utili zed between each set of zones and the total
number of trips on each link .
After models have been calibrated with base year data, they
are applied with forecast year land use and transportation
system characteristics to derive forecast year performance.
This basic process is used by MPOs across t he nation .
Based on economic and land use characteristics forecasted
for the study area in some fut ure year (general l y twenty
years), a long range transportat ion plan is produced. The
p lan is then staged, so that early implementation p r ojects
are timed for consistency with the long range plan.
The Reality: Change Cannot be Predicted with Certainty
An underl ying premise is that we can forecas t twenty years
into t he future. We then develop a master plan that would
optimally serve the forecasted future conditions.
The
reality is that the models are not very precise, and the
inputs to the models are fraught with uncertainty.
How precise can we be in forecasting social and economic
factors twenty years into the future? Consider the state
of the national economy twenty years from now; specifically
popul ation and employment. We need to make assumptions
about a myriad of factors --the possibility of war, major
recessions, petroleum product ion, and immigration policy.
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Consider then an individual s tate's share of the national
growth. For Florida we need to consider t he future of Cuba
and Haiti,
tourist
preferences,
potential
natural
disasters, and availability of potable water . Beyond the
state level estimates, we need to
forecast growth
increments in individual counties, which can be i nfluenced
by many factors unique to each county. Finally, we need to
disaggregate the growth estimates into hundreds of traffic
analysis zones in a given county .
Seems like a pretty
hopeless exercise, doesn't it? Yet, this is exactly what
we do every t ime we prepare a long range plan for an
urbanized area. We plan for an optimal response to a set
of forecast s that will almost certainly not ma terialize .
Examples of Forecast

Performanc~

It can be ins t ructive to review just a few e xamples of the
past performance of t ransportation forecasts.
Tampa Urban Area Transportation Study - In 1970, a
comprehensive urban area transportation study undertaken
for Tampa, Florida deve l oped traffic forecasts for the year
1985. Comparing the actual 1985 traffic volumes with the
forecas ts made in 1970 reveals that, of 87 different links
for which it was possible to compare actual 1985 traffic
counts with those forecasted in 1970, t he errors :ranged
from -78 percent to +281 percent .
The average absolute
link error was 57 percent--hardl y the kind of es timates we
would like to be using for major capital planning purposes.
Tampa CBD Employment Forecasts - During the early
1980s several forecasts were prepared of employment in the
Tampa central business district (CBD) . Forecasts projected
CBD employment to be at 75,000 to 80,000 by the year 2000.
In the mid-1980s new forecasts were made. By t hen, it was
clear CBD employment was not on track to 80, 000 by the year
2000; instead it "'as forecasted that employment would be in
the 55, 000 range by the year 2000, and ·would approach
90,000 by the year 2010. The reality has been that in the
years since 1980, CBD employment has been very flat,
falling in the 26, 000-28, 000 range in 1994. Unfortuna t e ly,
these forecasts were the basis for major capital facility
planning in the City for a decade.
British Case Studies - The Transport and Road Research
Laboratory published a study in which forecasts from 44
British urban transportation studies undertaken between
1962 and 1971 were compared with actual occurrences
(Mackinder and Evans, 1981). Even at an aggregate level,
it was found that nearly all of the forecast items
3
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considered were significantly overestimated. On average,
population was overestimated by 20 percent, and highway and
public transit trips by 30 to 35 percent . If one were to
measure t he errors in forecasting the incremental change in
various parameters, the results would be much worse .
Average forecasted population growth was three times the
observed growth, whi le forecasts of the growth in total
person trips were over six times the observed growth.
Guideway Transi t Case Studies - A number of st.udies
have examined the forecasting accuracy of the urban
transportation planning models as applied to fixed guideway
transit projects. A comparison· •of predicted and observed
modal split values i n Baltimore, San Francisco, and the
Twin Cities noted that the total prediction error was
between 25 and 65% of the predicted value.
It was also
noted that purposeful misuse of the models is c learly
possible; that the results can be easily biased toward a
desired "policy" direction (Talvitie, et.al., 1982).
One of the most controversial recent transportation
research works reported on eight u.S. cities that have
invested in rail transi t projects (Pickrell, 1990). It was
reported that ridership was consistently overestimated and
costs consistently underestimated.
It was noted that
decisions to implement these major investments have been
made based on very small forecasted differences i n
performance between alternatives, whereas the actual
performance of the selected alternatives has been
substantially different than the forecasts. If forecasting
errors are large in comparison to the differences in
alternatives, the planning process cannot be relied upon to
guide decision makers toward sensible decisions.

Technological
Forecasting
Ascher notes
the
susceptibility of transportation forecasts to technological
factors. He cites a Lockheed executive who predicted in
1956 that a family type convert i plane would be developed
within 15 years and that the family automobi l e would
largely be replaced by it (Ascher, 1978). Evans reinforces
this skepticism, noting t he recent preoccupation and
massive investment in IVHS research based on predictions of
vehicles travelling at enormous speeds a few feet apart on
automated highways. He notes that such a system would need
to have the reliability of the Challenger- ? spacecraft,
while be ing priced as a consumer item and maintained by
members of the general public. Those focussing on basics
are dismissed by enthusiasts as purveyors of negativism and
opponents of technology (Evans, 1993).
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Socio-Political Bias in Decision Making
When we reflect on a historical occurrence, we search for
reasons why i t was entire·ly predictable, even though
beforehand the evidence was very confusing and mixed and
some very intel ligent people made very confident, but
incorrect predictions (Behn and Vaupel; 1982).
We
perceive a past which held few surprises and predict a
future with little appreciation for the many surprises that
it will hold.
As difficult as it is for individuals to think clearly, can
it be any wonder that group decisions are even more
confounding? Moreover, government decision making, which
is answerable to diverse political constituencies, greatly
increases the complexity .
Media Bias Toward Dramat ic Forecasts - Popular media
can b ias our perceptions o£ current trends. Evans notes
that forecasts we read and hear about are systematically
biased due to a strong market for the dramatic.
A
prediction that some factor wil l remain large ly the same as
it is today generates no news and little i nterest, no
matter how accurate it may be (Evans, 1993).
Correl ation Among Forecasters - Schnaars s ugge sts that
forecas ters read the results of each others' forecasts ,
yielding a high level of correlation (Schnaars, 1989) .
Most of us have observed this in everyday life . How often
have we glibly repeated some "factual " account, only to
find that t he fact was nothing more than a rumor that had
gained credibility from repetition?
Forecasting What We Desire - One of the most difficult
biases to correct is the pressure to forecast what we
desire, rather than what is most likely. As noted in a
recent USDOT and EPA report, the forecasted d istributions
of regional population and employment are often an
erroneous input to t he transportation planning models
because of political compromise, rather than technical
expertise. Local officials want forecasts to reflect the
successful implementation of land use policies that prove
to be difficult to enforce (U.S. DOT and EPA, 1993). Human
nature being what i t i s , most of us are far more willing to
entertain evidence that supports our view of the world, and
resistant to accept contrary evidence.
Forecasting Ethics: The Bias of Advocacy - Wachs deals
with t he issue of ethics in forecasting, asserting that,
"The complexity of the mathemat ical models obscures the
5
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fact that the forecasts are more critically dependent on
assumptions than they are on mathematical manipulations and
that assumptions and parameters are continually adjusted

until the i ntended choice is justified by the forecasts"
(~lachs , 1986).
Planners Unwill i ng to Admit Uncertainty - Richard de
Neufville, one of the most effective proponents of the need
to deal with uncertainty, notes that a major obstacle wi ll
be overcoming the objections of a p rofessional staff who
make t heir li ving preparing forecasts. They can hardly be
expected to admit that their expen s ive efforts and s taff
cannot make accura~e predictions (de Neufville, 1990) .
Other Observations about Forecasting and Decision Making
A number of additional insight ful observations have been
made about current forecasting methods and the way we use
, forecasts in political decision making.
Satisficing Behavi or - Cognitive limitations force us
to construct a simplified model of the world to achieve
satisf i cing

solutions~

which

focus

on

achieving

a

satisfactory but not necessarily optimal solution (Dawes,
1988) . When we develop a master plan, it is limited not
only by t he realities of :uncertainty, but also by the
number of alternatives we can afford to examine.
Core Assumptions - Ascher notes that core assumptions
are more critical than the sophistication of the
forecas ting method . Further, he argue s t hat improvement in
techniques doe s not compensate for err oneous core
assumptions (Ascher, 1978).
Error I ncreases wi th Duration - Another point made by
Ascher is that t he longer the forecast period, the greater
chance that conditions affecting the forecast wi ll c hange.
Therefore, longer range forecasts are intrinsically more
difficult and are likely to be less accurate. While t his
conclusion may seem obvious, it has enormous implications
f or transportation planning practices, which typi cally plan
for twent y or more years into the future .
Requirements of a Strategic Transportation Planning Process
This paper has provided illustrations of the failures of
past forecasts, the complications of social and political
bias, and other characteristics o f deci sion making error.
The most significant problems with current transportation
planning practice are summarized below,
6
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The inability to predict the future.
Uncertainty
exists in future demand, technology, costs, resource
availability, and values. Imponderable and unpredictable
events will shape the future in ways we cannot hope to
anticipate.
l..

2. Current travel demand models are limited in their
ability to replicate the present, much less forecast the
f uture.
3 . Even if travel demand models were perfect, uncertainties
in the input variables are enormous, and to a large e xtent
unpredictable.
4. Limitations i n intuitive decision making often result in
fallacious interpretations of information.

s. social and political bias is a s trong contributor to

errors in anticipating future events and to our wil lingness
to deal with uncertainty .

Our inability to anticipate f uture conditions dictates
substantial changes to the way we do urban transportation
planning. As observed by Schnaars, " ... Asking the right
questions is superior to finding elaborate answers to the
wrong questions" (Schnaars, 1989). In many respects, the
current urban t ransportation planning process does the
latter- - it gives elaborate answers to the wrong questions .
In

contrast,

transportation

the desired features of . a strategic
planning process >~ould include
the

follo>~ing.

Understandable to Decision Makers and the General
Public - One of the most serious indictments of the
c urrent plann ing process is that it is ~ understandable
to the general public or to decision makers. Indeed, there
are
few professional
transportation planners that
understand the underlying technical assumptions. The new
process needs to be practical in terms of ease of
understanding by elected decision makers and the public.
Reasonable Financial Resources - Planning, although it
is extremely important, cannot consume more than a small
percent of the t otal transportation budget, or it will not
be tolerated. Thus, the new process must make prudent and
strategic u se of financial resources .
Promote Objectivity - The new process should promote
objectivity . While it cannot (and should not) remove the
7
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politics from decision making, the process should promote
the separation of politics from forecasting.
Political
tradeoffs should be based on information that is objective
and not contrived to support a predetermined political
agenda.
Incorporate Ranges of Assumptions - Previous sections
demonstrated the importance of assumptions, and the
difficulty of guessing the right assumptions.
The new
process should therefore incorporate ranges of assumptions
to attempt t o better reflect the possible outcomes.
Forecasts should reflect not just what i s likel y to occur,
bu~ also potential surprise outcomes.
Highlight Uncertainties - No matter what models are
used and what assumptions are used, ethical considerations
mandate that uncertainties be highlighted for decision
makers and for the public. Uncertainties can relate to
numerous factors, including demand, technology, costs,
resource availability, and values.
Place a Premium on Flexibilit y - Manheim has argued
that the only truly fi rm decision i s how to spend next
year's dollars.
He notes that an i mportant issue in
choosing an action for implementation is its de gree of
"commitment .. versus "flexibility.,; if ! this action is
implemented, which future options will be f oreclosed and
which will still remain open. He argues that the function
of the l ong-range plan should be to assess the long-range
consequences of near-term actions (Manheim, .1977) .
Putting it all Together:
A
Transportation Planning Process

New

Strategic

Urban

As noted previously, the reality of uncertainty does not
imply toe should abandon planning. It does demand that we
explicitly recognize uncertainty and deal with it in our
planning process. A number of recommendations can be made
at this time to better incorporate uncertainty into the
planning process. The specific steps that are recommended
i nclude:
A Strategic Vision - The process should begin with a
strategic vision. Indeed, any meaningful planning process
must have a vision of a desired outcome.
Elected
officials, as representatives of the general public, must
be able to articulate a vision of what they want their
community to be "when it grows up 11

•

Because of the critical interactions of transportation and
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land use,

the vision will need to incorporate land use,

community development and transportation. For long range
planning, the vision will necessarily be strategic -- it
will incorporate the general desired features, but will not
specify precise details, as these must be responsive to the
unknowable details of the future.
Identify Uncertainties: A Classical Strategic Planning
l?rocess
Once a
strategic
vision has been
articulated, a classical strategic planning process should
be
undertaken
to
identify
strengths,
weaknesses,
opportunities, and threats to reaching the desired outcome.
The incl usion of this activity represents a radical
departure from traditional planning ·practice ,
which
evaluates all available i nformation to estimate a single
expected value for each variable.
A numbe r of fundamental
uncertainties should be addressed by all transportation
planning efforts, including population, labor force, and
employment.
A critical element of the process should be the clear
enunciation of all assu mptions. This practice will require
a new awaren ess on t he part of professional staff to the
i mportance of assumptions in the analytical process.
Pl ap for the Short Run. with an Eye on the Long Run While it is not a major revelation that uncertainty
increases with duration, surprisingly, i t is a f act t hat i s
frequently ignored.
It is recommended that the focus of
tra nsportation planning on the twenty year horizon be
changed.
Instead, t he focus should be on current
defici enc i es, and on the five year horizon.
Initially,
a lter native actions for coping with immediate deficiencies
would be evaluated.
The traditional transportation
planning models could be run with current year traffic
analysis zonal data to t est alternative actions to correct
current deficiencies.
Following this application,
forecasts would be made of conditions five years into the
future. Importantly, assumptions and uncertainties would
be clearly illuminated.
Subsequently, based on the outputs of the five year
forecasts of socioeconomic and traffic conditions, the
forecasts would be extended to a ten year horizon.
Similarly, at t he conclusion of the ten year forecast, an
extensi on would be made to twenty years. Each step along
the
way,
projects
would
be
identified
to
meet
transportation system deficiencies in each increment.
Only one set of i nput variables would be necessary for the
9
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evaluation of current i mprovement projects, and for the
five year forecast.
Even over a five year period there
will be some uncertainties, but their impact on travel
demand should be relat ivel y minor. For the ten and twenty
year forecasts, input variables might include three
scenarios: a future believed to be the most likely to
occur, a future representing a significantly lower rate of
growth, and a future reflecting much stronger growth than
currently anticipated.
The emphasis would be on selecting the optimal short· term
plan, to meet the needs of the initial five year period,
but a sequence of improvements would be identified for each
subsequent increment . In contrast to the current process,
which is predicated on opt imizing the response to a highly
uncertain twenty year forecas t , t he recommended process is
focused on optimizing responses in a shorter five year time
frame, with an eye on the long term.
!n$;QrJ;~orate

Independent Peer Revi'i:ws - The preparation
of regional transportation plans, major corridor analyses,
and major activity center studies should include a new
task, an outside peer r evi ew, similar to value engineering
reviews. The principal purpose of the peer review w0 uld be
t o review all planning process assumptions, both explicit
and implicit, and to critique the reasonablen~ss of
results .
To minimize adverse impacts on the planning
process , an initial peer review should be conducted at the
conclusion of the development of zonal input data, prior to
running the transportation models. A second peer review
woul d be conducted following the application of the
transportation models and the identification of improvement
projects.
Promote Flexibility - Once >~e admit the reality of
uncertainty, flexibility becomes paramount. In a future
that holds unanticipated surprises, we need to place a high
value on retaining fut ure options. The planning process
should therefore identify which options are foreclosed by
a near term action.
Increment~!
Implementation
of
Major
Capital
Investments - For every major transportation capital
investment, an incremental implementation plan should be
developed that undertakes usable portions of the major
investment in a sequential program.

One of the most controversial categories of transportation
investments are major fixed guideway transit projects. The
planning that has been applied to these systems reflects
10
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many of the i d e ntifie d pitfalls. Risks and uncertainties,
part icularly as they relate to future ridership and costs,
h ave made it impossible to muster t he polit ical support to
implement such systems.
Can it be any surprise that
elected o ff icial s are reluctant to commit to systems that
will involve massive costs in return for uncertain future
benefits? We don't give enough attention to the here and
now. We might actually i mplement something one step at a
time, whereas the likel ihood of i mpleme n ting a plan based
on projections decades into the fu t ure seems highly
unl ikely.
I nstead of the "one -sho.t " l ong range p icture of the desi red

system decades i n to the' futu r e, an incremental approach is
recommended.
lve might begin by offering express bus
service using makeshift park and ride lots, mak i ng use of
church parking lots, or of under u t il ize d shopping center
parking spaces.
As demand increases, perma n e n t park and
ride f acilities can be constructed.
As warranted by
demand, high occupa ncy vehicle (HOV) fac ilities can be
implemented.
Preferential
bus
treatments
can be
cons tructed to allow buses to circumvent specific high
con gestion delay points .
As each of these actions is
taken, based on ridership af f irmation, political support
for · t he next increment o f
inves tment will bui ld.
Ul tima tel y, the a ddition of a guideway transit system can
be justified, with t he park and ride infrastructure already
in p lace.
The same p hilosophy holds for major highway capital
investments.
The Tampa I nterstat e System Master Plan
Study, f or example, adopted the tradi t ional approach of
developing a master plan to serve demands forecasted t o
exist in 20 years .
Designs are being prepared for small
pieces of the future mega-highway needed to serve t he 20
year demand .
lve will have segments const r ucted t o meet
a n ticipated 20 year needs, while other seg ments are failing
to meet current needs.
Only r ecently has there been a
recognition of the need for int erim improvements in advance
of the "ultimate" solution.
Perhaps we would have done
better to adopt a time - s t aged approach ,
evaluat ing
incremental i mp r ovements on a year to year basis .
Addit iona l Research Needs
The meas ures recommended above will go a long way toward
recognizing the uncertaint ies in the transportat ion
planning process.
However, work is continui n g on
integrating these methods into a more unified and
repl i cable approach.
ll
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